Kazakhstan’s nuclear power vote stirs controversy

Kazakh voters will go to the polls on October 6 to decide whether to approve the construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant — the world’s largest producer of uranium.

And the question on the ballot will be just that: “Do you agree with the construction of a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan?”

But the debate around nuclear power is much more complex, taking into account the heavy legacy of Soviet-era nuclear tests, long-standing nuclear phobia and unanswered questions around which companies – and countries – would build the plant if voters approve. it.

Ahead of Central Asia’s first nuclear referendum, RFE/RL takes a closer look at this conversation.

What does the Government say?

In many countries, national referendums can split ruling coalitions and prompt cabinet resignations, but there is no sign of that in Kazakhstan — the political elite is firmly behind the plan to build a nuclear power plant.

This extends from the government to the legislature, where all six parties support the idea and where at least one lawmaker who opposed the original plan now says he has changed his mind.

The government’s main argument is that only nuclear power has the capacity to provide near-zero carbon energy on the scale needed to cover an energy deficit that is growing year on year, especially in the southern half of the country.

Why not renewables?

While the total share of wind and solar energy in the national energy mix with heavy fossil fuels has increased to about 6% in recent years, Energy Minister Almasadam Satkaliev argues that renewables’ dependence on “natural and climatic conditions” makes them too ” unpredictable” on a large scale.

President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev first presented the idea of ​​using nuclear energy in 2019.

Like other officials, he assured the Kazakhs that a future nuclear power plant would be built with the latest technology to ensure the highest safety standards.

As the world’s largest uranium producer, he says it’s time for Kazakhstan to move up the nuclear fuel cycle.

Why hold a referendum?

This is a good question, given that any kind of popular vote carries a risk of protest, and the authoritarian regime in Kazakhstan has only recently held parliamentary elections (March 2023) and presidential elections (November 2022).

But the country’s leadership knows the issue is controversial — not least because the nation’s introduction to nuclear power began with the Soviet Union’s first nuclear bomb test in 1949, with hundreds of other people and a horrific environment in the northern Semai region -east.

Toqaev argued that holding a plebiscite on nuclear power is consistent with his concept of the “Listening State,” which translates as listening to the people.

And with so-called “administrative resources” firmly on the side of the government and a long history of controlled elections in Kazakhstan, few expect a resounding yes victory.

Polls approved by the government last month show that only 22.3 percent of Kazakhs now oppose the idea, down from 32.5 percent in August.

Meanwhile, non-government-sanctioned polls are illegal, and at least two citizen journalists and one media outlet have been fined after surveying public opinion on nuclear power in the run-up to the vote.

Is there a “No” campaign?

To the extent that Kazakhstan allows such things, there is.

But the non-nuclear detractors have been repeatedly blocked from holding demonstrations against the plan in various cities, and most recently found that a hotel in the largest city, Almaty — where they had earlier agreed to hold a event — he suddenly didn’t want to host them.

At least five Kazakh activists opposed to nuclear power were remanded in custody on charges of plotting mass unrest earlier this month, while others face administrative punishment.

Public debates in Kazakh cities over the past year have been emotional, particularly in Almaty, Astana and Ulken, which is the city closest to the expected site of the proposed facility on the southern shore of Lake Balkhash.

A prominent voice adding authority to the “no” campaign is Aset Nauryzbaev, a former top manager of the national electricity grid.

He argued that even the government’s estimate of $10-12 billion for the plant is too expensive for Kazakhstan, requiring either a steep increase in electricity tariffs or huge subsidies for power production.

Nauryzbaev argues that increasing renewable generation would be both feasible and four times cheaper than the nuclear option.

Other opponents say the project, which authorities expect to build over eight years, will become a magnet for corruption like so many other Kazakh megaprojects before it, compromising safety.

The government has countered that the necessary oversight of the project by international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency will ensure high levels of compliance and minimize the risks of corruption.

Will Russia build it?

The word “Russia” will not appear on the ballot. But for many it is one of the most important questions to ask.

Moscow made a major contribution to global nuclear phobia in the first weeks of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, when Russian military forces occupied territory around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, sparking fears of war-related nuclear fallout.

And Moscow-based nuclear power giant Rosatom, which is slated to build a smaller nuclear facility in neighboring Uzbekistan, could pose a risk of sanctions in the future, even if the company is not currently targeted by the kind of retaliatory measures on which Western governments have slapped. on other Russian companies.

So far, Rosatom is only one of four contractors whose reactors are being considered for the future plant, along with France’s EDF, China National Nuclear Corporation and South Korea’s Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power.

Intriguingly, Kazakh authorities have mentioned the prospect of an international consortium working on the project — a good example of the “multi-vector” foreign policy Astana has been vigorously promoting since the war in Ukraine began.

But soaring geopolitical tensions would certainly make Russia an unwelcome partner for Seoul and Paris, if not for Beijing.

And with the Kremlin already irritated by its ally Kazakhstan’s neutral stance on the war, the cost to Moscow of completely abandoning such a strategic project could be too great for the Central Asian country to contemplate.

Via RFE/RL

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