Who is to blame for the deadly Grenfell Tower fire in 2017?

A public inquiry into the devastating Grenfell Tower fire in London in 2017 concluded on Wednesday that “decades of failure” by the government and the construction industry ultimately led to the disaster that killed 72 people.

The report detailed how the government, council, architects, contractors, local council and management firms involved in retrofitting with flammable cladding – exterior panels designed to improve appearance and add insulation – bear most of the blame for what what happened seven years ago.

GOVERNMENT

The report said the government, which at the time was led by former Conservative prime minister Theresa May, had had “many opportunities” over the years to identify the risks posed by the use of combustible cladding and insulation in high-rise buildings, which it ignored numerous warnings and failed to act.

UK Grenfell Tower fire inquiry blames incompetence and greed for all deaths

In 2001, the government ignored the “striking results” of a large-scale test involving flammable cladding and failed to communicate the dangers to the industry.

Following a 2009 fire at Lakanal House, another high-rise block in south London, the government’s thinking was so focused on deregulation that it ignored or postponed matters affecting life safety, the report said.

Inquiry chairman Martin Moore-Bick said previous governments and others had failed to change guidance on the construction of external walls: “That’s where the seeds of disaster were sown.”

ROYAL BOROUGH OF KENSINGTON AND CHELSEA (RBKC)

The wealthy Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC), the local authority, failed to scrutinize the design or choice of materials and ensure that the building met construction requirements when the renovation work was completed.

“Therefore, (RBKC) bears considerable responsibility for the dangerous conditions of the building immediately after the completion of the work,” the report said.

The RBKC and central government response to the Grenfell fire and the needs of victims has been “confused, slow, indecisive and fragmented”, demonstrating at times a “marked lack of respect for human decency and dignity”.

Many victims felt abandoned by the authorities and completely helpless, with their only support coming from volunteers.

Elizabeth Campbell, leader of Kensington and Chelsea Council, apologized “unreservedly” for “our failure to listen to residents and protect them”.

“We fully accept the findings, which are a scathing critique of a broken system from the top down. It is crystal clear – profits were put before people, clear warning signs were ignored and Grenfell was completely avoidable, with failures at every level,” Campbell said in a statement.

TENANT MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

The Tenant Management Organization (TMO), the public body that exercises control over the building and RBKC were jointly responsible for managing fire safety at Grenfell Tower.

The report said that the TMO wanted to reduce the cost of refurbishing the tower by using ACM panels and must also bear the responsibility for the disaster. He did not take enough care in the choice of the architect and in matters of fire safety.

companies

A significant reason why Grenfell Tower ended up being clad in combustible insulation panels and aluminum composite materials (ACM) was “systematic dishonesty” by a range of companies, the report said, adding some rigged testing processes, misrepresentation tested data and misleading the market. .

The French subsidiary of the American company Arconic manufactured and sold ACM cladding and from 2005 until after the fire “deliberately concealed from the market the true extent of the danger” of such cladding.

In response to the report, Arconic said its product was safe and legal and that it regularly tested its materials. It said it had not withheld information or misled any certification body, customer or the public.

Arconic said its subsidiary has fully cooperated with the investigation.

Celotex and Kingspan, which made the foam insulation, are also to blame, the report said.

In an attempt to break into the high-rise insulation market, Celotex “engaged in a dishonest scheme to mislead its customers and the market in general.”

Kingspan sold insulation that was not suitable for external use in tall buildings.

Kingspan said in a statement that the type of insulation was immaterial and that the main reason for the spread of the fire was the ACM cladding, which was not made by Kingspan.

“Kingspan has long recognized the wholly unacceptable historical failures that occurred in part of our UK insulation business. They were in no way reflective of how we behaved as a group, then or now,” it said.

ARCHITECTS AND OTHER CONTRACTORS

None of those involved in the design of the exterior walls or the choice of materials, such as architectural firm Studio E, “acted to the standards of a person reasonably competent in their position,” the report said.

Studio E, responsible for the design of the exterior walls and the choice of materials, wanted to use zinc rain panels, but the ACM version was chosen largely for reasons of cost.

Building contractor Rydon was able to deliver a substantial saving thanks to its relationship with cladding subcontractor Harley. The inquest said all three had a casual approach to contractual relationships.

Harley, the report said, did not pay sufficient attention to fire safety at any stage of the renovation.

Studio E demonstrated a “chivalrous attitude” towards fire safety regulations and Rydon and Harley relied on their previous experience rather than any technical analysis or expertise.

Fire safety inspectors Exova were instructed by Studio E, on behalf of the TMO, to prepare a fire safety strategy for Grenfell, but although a draft was prepared, it was never completed.

LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

After the fatal fire at Lakanal House, the London Fire Brigade (LFB) should have been “warned” of “shortcomings in its own ability to fight high-rise fires”, the report said. Also, LFB should have made better use of the knowledge gained.

The LFB, the report said, was unprepared to deal with Grenfell for a number of reasons, including a “chronic lack of effective management and leadership” and the “unfounded assumption” that pre-existing building regulations were sufficient.

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS NAMED IN THE REPORT

The Building Research Establishment was instrumental in allowing Celotex and Kingspan to market their insulation products for use in the external walls of high-rise buildings, while the National House Building Council failed to ensure that its building control function remains “free from commercial pressures. “

(Reporting by Catarina Demony and Michael Holden; Editing by Elizabeth Piper and Alexandra Hudson)

Photo: Smoke rises from a high-rise apartment building that caught fire in London, Wednesday, June 14, 2017. (AP Photo/Matt Dunham)