Afghanistan’s neighbors seek stability, not another civil war

Ahmad Massoud, the leader of Afghanistan’s National Resistance Front, recently said he would defeat the Taliban “no matter the odds.”

For Massoud to mount a military threat to the Taliban, he would need the cooperation of the Central Asian republics, Iran or Pakistan (among others) to do the job. However, Afghanistan’s neighbors are not interested in another civil war in Afghanistan, as the violence and refugees would spill over their borders and cause economic dislocation and unrest as far as Europe.

After two decades of US-sponsored chaos in the Hindu Kush, all the region wants is to recover the missed opportunities of the “lost decades” of 2001-2021.

None of Afghanistan’s neighbors prefer the Taliban to any other group and oppose the regime’s unrepresentative government and policies towards women. That said, their leaders must solve today’s problems, despite their distaste for the Taliban’s retrograde ways.

The republics’ approach to Kabul has long been “neighbours forever” – or, for pessimists, “captives of geography”. Kazakhstan removed the Taliban from its terrorist list in December 2023; Uzbekistan has never declared the Taliban an extremist group, and in 2018 publicly encouraged the Taliban to begin negotiations with the Islamic Republic. Turkmenistan dealt with the issue of the Taliban in accordance with its policy of permanent neutrality. In September 2024, the head of Tajikistan’s security service visited Kabul for talks that were described as “productive”, and in the same month, the Kyrgyz Republic removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations.

Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbors collaborate to facilitate trade and transport; the renovation of Afghanistan’s roads and railways; help Afghanistan improve irrigation projects; transport natural gas from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India; building a railway from Uzbekistan to Pakistani seaports; and building a multimodal transport corridor from Kazakhstan to Pakistan, ending in the United Arab Emirates.

Related: US, Canada to discuss oil-rich Arctic seabed claims

Economic growth depends on an adequate water supply; The Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan form the headwaters of the region’s basins.

In March 2022, the Taliban launched construction of the 285 km Qosh Tepa Canal, which will divert 10 billion cubic meters of water annually from the Amu Darya River, on which water-starved Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan rely. They will suffer a 15 percent reduction in current supply. The project will cost $684 million, but will irrigate 2,100 square miles and create 250,000 jobs. Kabul considers it essential to ensure food security for the emirate.

Tashkent and Ashgabat are unhappy with the project, but the Uzbeks have provided technical assistance to Afghanistan to ensure construction is “in accordance with international norms”. Now is a good time to consider inviting Afghanistan to join Central Asia’s regional water management organization, the Central Asian Interstate Water Coordinating Commission.

Afghanistan also has unresolved water issues with Iran and Pakistan; those projects would be jeopardized or further delayed by a civil war.

According to the United Nations, there are now 7.6 million Afghans in Iran and Pakistan, most of them refugees. In 2023, Pakistan expelled more than 540,000 Afghan refugees, and the next phase of the plan could see another 800,000 Afghans deported. Increased violence will likely reverse these flows and burden Iran and Pakistan, which cannot afford to support the refugees they now have.

China recently warned Pakistan that it must take control of the violence that threatens the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. More violence north of the Durand Line will further delay the corridor, which may be seen as a strategic “win” in Washington, but will affect Central and South Asia.

In April 2022, the Taliban banned poppy cultivation and the production of methamphetamines. This benefits Iran, which has the highest rate of opium users in the world, according to the World Health Organization. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Over 3,700 national law enforcement officials have been killed and over 12,000 maimed in counter-narcotics operations over the past three decades.”

That’s good news, but if Afghanistan has to fund a war against groups like the National Resistance Front (and its foreign allies), drug prohibition could fall by the wayside.

In fact, if the Taliban suspects a foreign hand in an attack, will it encourage al-Qaeda and the Islamic State to strike foreign targets? Sure, that will violate the Afghanistan Peace Accord, where the Taliban agreed that “Afghan soil will not be used against the security of the United States and its allies,” but the Taliban will note that the Americans promised: “The United States and its allies they shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Afghanistan or from interfering in its internal affairs.”

Are the Taliban isolated? No, seventeen countries, including every country bordering Afghanistan plus the European Union, maintain a diplomatic presence in Kabul. Aaron Zelin reports that “between August 2021 and February 22, 2024, the Taliban publicly announced 1,382 diplomatic meetings with at least eighty countries.” China and the United Arab Emirates accepted credentials from the Taliban ambassador in their capitals.

Pragmatism can win, regardless of what governments or their citizens think about Taliban policies.

After Shohna ba Shohna (Shoulder to Shoulder) proved weak, it is time for the locals to lead, although Washington and Brussels can help by facilitating diplomatic and economic support of beneficial projects. Americans, in particular, will need a wide-open mind to understand the region’s needs and opportunities instead of obsessing over what might have been.

The defeat of the US and NATO may have seen the end of the era of empires in Central Asia and Afghanistan, following the Russian Empire (1713–1917), the British interventions (1839–1919), the Soviet Empire (1917–1991), and the American empire (2001–2021 ).

Some questionable characters will make a few bucks along the way, but that’s the price of repairing the damage done by the crusade to reform Afghan culture as part of Washington’s post-9/11 war on terror, “the first great global experiment of the twenty-first. century.”

By James Durso

More top reads from Oilprice.com