Spy watchdog’s foreign meddling review finds ‘unacceptable gaps’ in accountability

OTTAWA — The Canadian Security Intelligence Service and Public Safety Canada lacked a system to track who received and read specific information on foreign interference, creating “unacceptable gaps in accountability,” the country’s spy watchdog has found.

In a report released late Monday, the National Security and Intelligence Analysis Agency also said CSIS’s distribution of information on foreign political interference was inconsistent during the last two general elections.

“The reasoning behind decisions about whether, when, and how to release information was not clear, directly affecting the flow of information,” the report said, adding that the threat posed by jamming activities “was not clearly communicated by CSIS.”

Moreover, those who received information did not always understand its significance or how to integrate the findings into their policy analysis and decision-making.

The watchdog also said there was disagreement between intelligence units and senior civil servants over whether the activities described in the briefs constituted foreign interference or legitimate diplomatic activity.

The analysis examined information about China’s attempted foreign interference in federal democratic institutions and processes from 2018 to 2023, focusing on how the information circulated within the government. Some passages in the report were deemed too sensitive to be made public.

CSIS faced a basic dilemma about disseminating information during the election, the analysis agency found.

“On the one hand, intelligence on foreign election interference was a priority for the government, and CSIS turned its collection apparatus toward investigating foreign political interference,” the report said.

“On the other hand, CSIS was sensitive to the possibility that the collection and dissemination of election information could be interpreted as a form of election interference. An underlying tension occurred: any action—including the dissemination of information—taken by CSIS before or during an election must not, and must not be seen to, influence that election.”

This dynamic was known within CSIS but “is not formally addressed in policy or guidelines,” the review agency concluded.

The consequences of not knowing who received what information became apparent in the case of information about China’s targeting of a sitting MP – apparently Conservative Michael Chong, although he is not named in the report.

Media and public conversation about this information has focused on two CSIS memos, one from May 2021 and the other from July 2021, the Watchdog report said.

In fact, neither product was the mechanism by which the minister and deputy minister of public safety were initially supposed to be informed of China’s threat activities against the lawmaker and his family, the agency found.

Rather, there was CSIS intelligence connected to Chong who turned over these memos. CSIS sent the information to a list of recipients that included the deputy minister and the minister. Public Safety confirmed to the watchdog that at least one piece of information was provided to the minister before May 2021, presumably as part of a weekly reading package.

“However, the department was ‘unable to account’ for it.

“This is an unacceptable state of affairs,” the report said.

The intelligence review agency recommended “that, as a basic accountability mechanism, CSIS and Public Safety rigorously track and document who has received and, as appropriate, read intelligence products.”

The watchdog also asked CSIS to develop, in consultation with other actors, a comprehensive policy governing its engagement with threats related to foreign political interference.

It said this should explain CSIS’s “thresholds and practices” for sharing information about the mix. “This would include the relevant levels of confidence, corroboration, contextualization and characterization required for the information to be reported.”

The policy should also “clearly articulate CSIS’s risk tolerance for taking action” against interference threats and establish explicit approval and notification processes — including external consultations — for all anti-interference activities.

Democratic Institutions Minister Dominic LeBlanc, who added the public safety portfolio to his responsibilities last July, welcomed the report, saying it would “inform and strengthen our ongoing efforts to better detect, deter and counter foreign interference”. .

The report said senior civil servants and the national security and intelligence adviser sometimes disagreed over whether intelligence assessments should be shared with the executive branch, resulting in two products not reaching politicians, including first- Minister Justin Trudeau.

The watchdog recommended that the role of the security adviser, including in relation to decisions on the flow of information, be spelled out in law.

Under a federal protocol introduced by the Liberals in 2019, there would be a public announcement if a group of bureaucrats determined that an incident — or an accumulation of incidents — threatened Canada’s ability to have free and fair elections.

There was no such announcement for the 2019 or 2021 general elections. In both elections, the Liberals were returned to government with minority seats, while the Conservatives formed the official opposition.

The panel receives information from sources including the Task Force on Security Threats and Election Intelligence, made up of representatives from CSIS, the RCMP, Global Affairs Canada and the Communications Security Establishment, Canada’s cyber-espionage agency.

The intelligence review agency found that Task Force SITE and the group “were not adequately designed to address traditional, human-based foreign interference.”

Specifically, the agency noted that the task force focuses on threat activities during the election period, but “traditional foreign interference also occurs between elections.”

The agency also found that the panel’s high threshold for a public notice is unlikely to be triggered by such foreign interference, which typically targets specific ridings.

The watchdog recommended that the task force “align its priorities with the threat landscape,” including threats that arise outside of the immediate election period. He also said Global Affairs representation on the task force should leverage the department’s ability to analyze and address traditional mix, not just online threats.

The intelligence agency’s findings follow a recent interim report by a federal commission of inquiry that said China’s foreign meddling did not affect the overall results of the 2019 and 2021 general elections.

In her report, commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue said that while the results in a small number of ridings may have been affected by interference, this cannot be said with certainty.

This report by The Canadian Press was first published on May 27, 2024.

Jim Bronskill, Canadian Press